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Summary: Many theorists writing on the aftermath of wrongdoing 
have been influenced by Trudy Govier’s emphasis on interpersonal 
relationships. But George Sher has recently challenged this talk of 
relationships. Read descriptively, he argues, claims about the 
interpersonal effects of wrongdoing are either exaggerated or false. 
Read normatively, relationships add nothing to more traditional moral 
theory. In this essay, I argue that Govier’s relational framework both 
avoids Sher’s dilemma and enables her to develop the notion of respect 
for persons in ways that improve upon traditional Kantian discussions.  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The concept of a relationship plays a prominent role in 
Trudy Govier’s discussions of the moral issues that arise 
in the aftermath of wrongdoing (DistrustPP, FR, and TWS; 
Prerogative, PPApologies, and National; and Invitational). 
Over the past decade, a number of theorists have followed 
her lead. For example, relationships figure importantly in 
Margaret Urban Walker’s work on forgiveness (2007), 
T.M. Scanlon’s account of blame (2008), Christopher 
Bennett’s defense of punishment (2008), Colleen 
Murphy’s theory of political reconciliation (2010), and my 
own account of atonement (Radzik 2009). 31  However, 
George Sher argues that, while it is unclear whether the 
claims being made about relationships in this literature 
should be read descriptively or normatively, both readings 
lead to problems (2013).  
                                                        
31  The types of wrongdoing addressed by relational theorists, 
including Govier, range from everyday slights and betrayals among 
friends, to criminal acts, to large-scale atrocities. Unless otherwise 
indicated, I will use “wrongdoing” to refer to this broad class of 
misdeeds. 
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In this essay, I will argue that the combination of 
descriptive and normative concerns that we find in Govier 
and the writers she has influenced is defensible. As I read 
Govier, she provides a bridge between an ideal, Kantian 
ethic of respect for persons, in which human beings are 
conceived of as rational moral agents, and the messier facts 
of life, in which moral agents are imperfectly rational, 
emotionally complicated, deeply social, epistemically 
limited, and intensely vulnerable. Govier’s relational 
moral-theoretical framework enables her to both diagnose 
the moral problems that arise in the wake of wrongdoing 
and show how an ethic of respect offers meaningful 
guidance to real world actors. 
I will not present a close reading of Govier’s writings 
or those of the other authors in this literature. I agree with 
Sher that relational theories of the aftermath of 
wrongdoing have been ambiguous or under-described in 
ways that have left them open to his critique. Yet when I 
first read Forgiveness and Revenge, its relationship-
centered moral perspective resonated with me (FR). In this 
essay, I try to articulate and develop my understanding of 
that perspective. Trudy Govier may not agree with 
everything that I say here. But I hope that she will 
recognize how much I have learned from her.  
 
 
2.  Sher’s dilemma 
 
The relational moral theories that Sher targets aim to 
justify one or another response to wrongdoing: blame, 
punishment, forgiveness, or atonement. Sher characterizes 
these responses as “backward-looking,” which captures 
the idea that such judgments and actions are intelligible 
only insofar as they harken back to some past wrongful 
action (2013, 48). For example, one cannot forgive if there 
has been no wrong. Furthermore, in characterizing these 
responses as backward-looking, we appeal to the intuition 
that past wrongdoing intrinsically calls out for some kind 
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of response. The very fact of the past wrong seems to place 
someone (the wrongdoer, the community, or the victim) 
under normative pressure, such that simply continuing as 
if the wrong had not occurred would be morally 
problematic. I would add that relational theories are also 
typically forward-looking. They hope to show that a 
proper response to wrongdoing will normally lead to a 
better state of affairs. Blame, punishment, forgiveness, and 
atonement, at least when done well, aim toward some 
future good. Whether these backward-looking and 
forward-looking concerns – giving the past its due while 
building a better future – are ultimately compatible is one 
of the issues with which relational theorists wrestle. The 
tensions are perhaps clearest in the cases of political 
wrongdoing that Govier has treated in her work with 
Wilhelm Verwoerd (Prerogative; PPApologies; and 
National). For example, did the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission wrongly prioritize future 
political stability over the justified claims of the victims of 
apartheid?  
Relational defenses of responses to wrongdoing 
generally follow a similar pattern, which can be 
summarized with the following argument schema: 
  
1. People stand in relationships with one another.  
2. Wrongdoing damages relationships.  
3. Relationships are (partially) repaired through blame, 
punishment, forgiveness, or atonement.  
4. We morally ought to repair our relationships.  
5. Therefore, such responses to wrongdoing are morally 
justified (or perhaps even required).32 
 
                                                        
32 This schema fits some examples better for others. For example, 
Scanlon’s key claim about blame is that it registers the fact that 
relationships have changed, not that it helps repair them (2008, Ch. 4). 
However, he does mention the possibility of reparative effects in some 
cases. 
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Here, the concept of a relationship provides the link 
between the backward-looking and the forward-looking 
concerns that animate the theorist. The problem posed by 
the past is the damage that has been done to relationships. 
In repairing that damage, we set ourselves on a better path. 
Our concern for the past and our concern for the future are 
reconciled.  
In developing a relational justification of any 
particular response to wrongdoing, one attempts to show 
how it properly acknowledges the significance of the past 
while contributing to a better future. So, for example, 
defenders of forgiveness emphasize its peace-building 
potential, but they must also address the objection that a 
victim might subtly condone wrongdoing by forgiving in 
the absence of an apology (Hieronymi 2001; Holmgren 
2012, Ch. 4). A relational justification of blame points to 
the possible good effects of blaming practices, such as the 
moral education of wrongdoers or the broader 
communication of norms (Radzik 2014). Relational 
defenders of punishment argue that, by punishing, the 
community sends victims messages of respect and helps 
them rebuild trust and self-esteem (Bennett 2008; 
Ciochetti 2003).  
Sher objects that relational arguments of the form 
presented above are ambiguous. The claims that 
correspond to premises (1)-(3) in my schema often sound 
as though they are making descriptive, empirically 
verifiable claims about human relationships. But at other 
times, (1)-(3) are clearly meant to convey normative 
standards for how people should relate to one another. So, 
should we read them as descriptive or as normative? Sher 
argues that neither reading yields a compelling theory.  
Consider first the descriptive reading. People in fact 
hold certain attitudes toward and expectations of others. 
They interact according to certain patterns. A wrong 
committed by one person against the other tends to cause 
changes in the ways they regard each other and interact 
with one another. Blaming, punitive, forgiving, or atoning 
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responses generally cause further psychological and 
behavioral changes. Sher’s first objection to this 
descriptive reading is what he calls the “problem of the 
stranger.” Since “a stranger is, by definition, someone with 
whom one has no relationship,” an account of wrongdoing 
and repair that assumes an actual relationship exists will 
“fail to accommodate many—perhaps a majority—of the 
cases in which blame, punishment, or the making of 
amends seems appropriate” (2013, 55 and 48). Govier 
anticipates the problem of the stranger, writing that, 
although there may have been no relationship between two 
strangers prior to the wrong, the wrong itself creates a 
powerful form of relationship, which is in need of moral 
improvement (FR, 47-8).33  
This move may help us to extend the relational 
argument schema to the entire class of interpersonal 
wrongdoing. However, Sher further objects that when we 
read claims like (1)-(3) as empirical generalizations about 
actual human psychological and behavioral phenomena 
they seem “remarkably implausible” (2013, 57). 
Highlighting relational accounts of crime and punishment, 
Sher doubts that all or even many crime victims are 
emotionally damaged or rendered less capable of trust as 
relational theorists suggest. “Where most crimes are 
concerned,” involving as they do things such as petty theft 
or property damage, “common experience suggests that 
most victims simply shrug it off, some sooner and some 
later, and get on with their lives” (2013, 57). Nor does the 
punishment of criminals seem to heal victims’ wounds as 
effectively as relational defenders of punishment would 
like us to believe. “[A] crime victim who needs 
psychotherapy before the criminal is convicted will almost 
                                                        
33 Here, Govier provides an explicit response to the problem of the 
stranger. However, I believe that her work also implies a second 
response, namely that, strangers always, even prior to any wrong, 
stand in a distinctively normative relationship with one another (see, 
for example, DistrustPP, 52). I will develop this second response to 
the problem of the stranger in section 3.  
 WSIA Vol. 4: Reasonable Responses pg. 110 
 
certainly continue to need it afterward” (2013, 57). Unless 
relational damage is actually caused and actually repaired, 
this version of the argument is unable to justify practices 
of blame, punishment, forgiveness, or atonement.  
If we read claims (1)-(3) as normative rather than 
descriptive, we can avoid the problem of the stranger. 
Premise (1) now says merely that people should think of 
themselves as participating in norm-governed 
relationships with others, even strangers. Premise (2) 
means that wrongdoing violates the norms that properly 
govern these relationships. (3) states that responses such 
as blame, forgiveness, punishment or atonement somehow 
make more positive normative judgments appropriate. 
These normative judgments may be applied to situations 
involving strangers as well as those involving friends.  
But given this normative interpretation of relational 
theories, Sher objects, it is unclear what talk of 
relationships adds to more traditional moral theories, such 
as Kantianism (Sher 2013, 51). What is gained in 
describing the transgressing stranger as having damaged 
some idealized relationship rather than simply as having 
violated Kant’s categorical imperative, “Act in such a way 
that you always treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a 
means, but always at the same time as an end” (1993, 36)? 
What does the claim that relationships within society are 
repaired by punishment add to familiar theories that justify 
punishment through a mix of desert claims and appeals to 
deterrence? Reference to a relationship appears to be an 
“idle wheel” in contemporary moral theory (Sher 2013, 
55). In the dilemma Sher poses, neither the descriptive nor 
the normative reading of relationships is compelling. 
Sher is correct that the relational argument is 
ambiguous between descriptive and normative readings. In 
what follows, I try to clarify the relational approach in a 
way that dissolves Sher’s dilemma. I proceed by 
examining various possible interpretations of each of the 
premises in the argument schema. I conclude that the 
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strongest version of the argument brings in both 
descriptive and normative claims at a number of different 
points. In response to Sher, I argue that modest versions of 
the descriptive claims suffice and that, far from being an 
idle wheel in moral theory, the concept of a relationship 




3.  People stand in relationships with one another 
 
Let us start with the first premise in the argument schema: 
‘People stand in relationships with one another.’ In the 
relational literature, writers tend to alternate between 
describing actual patterns of human attitudes and 
interactions and endorsing normative standards for 
interpersonal attitudes and interactions. In this section, I 
will clarify these different ways of talking about 
relationships.  
In describing actual relationships, we attend to the 
beliefs, attitudes, emotions and expectations people in fact 
hold regarding others and the actual patterns of interaction 
shaped by these psychological states. Importantly, the 
phenomena of interest are interpersonal. I hold beliefs, 
attitudes, and expectations with regard to my car, but 
theorists would not describe me as having a relationship 
with my car (in the relevant sense) because the car does 
not, in turn, hold beliefs, attitudes and expectations toward 
me. Govier’s conception of relationships in Forgiveness 
and Revenge emphasizes the awareness that the other party 
is a person; he is someone, who, like me, acts for reasons, 
has preferences, and feels emotions (FR, 164-68). To 
apply a well-known distinction from P.F. Strawson, one 
person can be described as standing in a relationship with 
another person when she adopts the “participant” stance 
toward him rather than the “objective” stance (1962). 
Rather than viewing him simply as a complex organism to 
be studied, hypothesized about, and manipulated, someone 
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who takes the participant stance perceives him as a 
responsible agent who will make choices for reasons and 
with whom she is bound in a web of mutual demands and 
expectations. As Strawson notes, we are also 
psychologically capable of viewing other people from the 
objective stance, at least for a little while. We might do this 
“as a refuge, say, from the strains of involvement; or as an 
aid to policy; or simply out of intellectual curiosity” 
(Strawson 1962, 195). But I suggest that when relational 
theorists talk about relationships in a descriptive sense, we 
can interpret them as referring to the psychological 
phenomenon of people taking up the participant stance 
with regard to another person. 
Strawson coined the term “reactive attitudes” to draw 
our attention to interpersonal attitudes, such as resentment 
and gratitude, that are reactions to the attitudes that one 
person interprets the other as holding (1962, 192). I do not 
resent someone who unavoidably steps on my foot but 
only someone who I perceive as acting with an improper 
attitude toward me, such as animosity or indifference to 
my legitimate interests. To occupy the participant stance 
with regard to another person just is to be liable to these 
sorts of reactive attitudes.   
This descriptive conception of what it is to stand in a 
relationship with another person provides a sense in which 
we are capable of having relationships with strangers as 
well as with friends and family members. Though we hold 
particularly robust expectations of the people close to us, 
we frequently also inhabit the participant stance with 
respect to strangers. Insofar as we interact with them, we 
tend to expect their behavior to be guided by certain 
norms, and when those expectations are violated we are 
liable to react with negative attitudes, such as resentment 
and indignation. Such reactions are signs that we did, in 
fact, harbor such expectations prior to the breach, even if 
we may not have noticed them.  
Reading Strawson in this way, as identifying 
distinctive psychological phenomena, we have a rough 
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interpretation of the descriptive use of the term “standing 
in a relationship.” It refers to a distinctive set of attitudes, 
expectations, emotional and behavioral dispositions that 
one person may hold toward another, which we refer to as 
taking up a participant stance.   
The shift to a normative conception of relationships is 
made when we combine this description of interpersonal 
relationships with a Kantian ethic, which tells us that we 
must always take the participant stance toward other 
human beings.34 That is, we are morally required to regard 
other human beings as moral agents. We are obliged to 
interact with them in ways that reflect awareness of their 
status as persons. Furthermore, a full and proper 
appreciation of their personhood provides a set of moral 
standards for these interactions. We are not allowed to treat 
other people as if they were mere means rather than ends 
in themselves. Our behavior, and also our intentions and 
attitudes, must be consistent with their dignity. In addition 
to avoiding disrespect, a proper appreciation of their value 
also requires us to have some degree of goodwill toward 
them, even though we are typically free to choose upon 
whom we will bestow benevolence (Kant 1993, 32).  
This point is important to answering Sher’s critique of 
the normative reading of relationships. For most relational 
moral theories, normative talk about relationships is not 
meant to provide an alternative to an ethic of respect for 
persons, but rather an interpretation of it. What Kant states 
in terms of obeying the categorical imperative can be 
translated into the language of maintaining morally 
appropriate relationships. But the relational framework 
also helps us articulate significant aspects of the situation 
that are often occluded by other, more individualistic, 
Kantian language. For example, I consider not just the 
                                                        
34 A Kantian may permit adopting the observant stance toward another 
person for a particular purpose, such as scientific research. However, 
one must also, at the same time, take the participant stance if one is to 
remain aware that the other person is not merely a means for advancing 
science but also an end in himself. 
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universalizability of my maxims but whether my actual 
relationships match up to the ideal of morally appropriate 
relationships. Conceptualizing the other as a participant in 
a relationship, I am aware of the other person being aware 
of me (cf. Darwall 2006, 43). This awareness leads me to 
consider how she might interpret my intentions and 
respond to them emotionally, and how these responses 
may affect our future interactions. When thinking of 
myself as standing in a relationship with her, I am better 
prepared to recognize that our beliefs, attitudes and 
expectations regarding one another will be limited by our 
epistemic circumstances, personal history, social context, 
and emotional dispositions. I am led to consider the 
vulnerability of relationships to miscommunication, 
failures of rationality, emotional complexity, and 
unwieldy, socially constructed meanings. All of these 
factors affect the possibility of restoring relationships of 
respect and goodwill in the aftermath of wrongdoing.  
By conceptualizing persons as standing in norm-
governed relationships with one another, a relational 
moral-theoretical framework can also easily accommodate 
consideration of special as well as general moral 
obligations. We are bound up in webs of legitimate 
expectation and dependency with other people, not just as 
fellow human beings, but also as friends, colleagues, or 
family members.  
Finally, when we express our normative ideals in 
terms of achieving morally appropriate relationships with 
other people, rather than, say, forming our own maxims 
correctly, we may be primed to attend to the social 
conditions that enable higher quality relationships. (In this 
way, relational theory strikes Hegelian as well as Kantian 
notes.) In many post-wrongdoing scenarios, improved 
relations turn on issues of trust. Govier argues that basic 
trust, “a sense that others, even those who are total 
strangers, have no intention to harm us, [is] a necessary 
condition of a viable social life”; it is “essential for 
communication and effective cooperative action” 
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(DistrustPP, 52). A healthy moral community will be one 
in which people regard one another with respect and 
goodwill and feel confident that other people regard them 
with respect and goodwill in return. Translating Kantian 
respect for persons into a relational moral-framework 
helps us see how the achievement of our moral ideals 
requires an awareness of such social dynamics.    
 So far we have distinguished a descriptive conception 
of relationships (people stand in relation when they in fact 
take the participant stance toward one another) from a 
normative conception of relationships (people are morally 
required to take the participant stance toward others and 
their attitudes, expectations and actions should meet 
standards of respect and goodwill). As Sher’s “problem of 
the stranger” highlights, if the basic argument of the 
relational theorist is to apply to all cases of wrongdoing, 
premise (1), that ‘people stand in relationships,’ must be 
given a normative interpretation. If we instead used the 
purely descriptive interpretation, then one could evade 
calls to repair relations simply by failing to take the 
participant stance toward the other parties in the wrongful 
interaction. Let us, then, read (1) normatively:  
 
1n. All people ought to take up the participant stance 
toward one another and cultivate relationships of 
respect and goodwill.  
 
The “ought” marks (1n) as a normative claim.  
 
 
4.  Wrongdoing damages relationships 
 
The second premise in the relational argument schema is 
‘wrongdoing damages relationships.’ Sher has pointed out 
that this claim is ambiguous between a descriptive reading 
and a normative reading. Let us consider in more detail 
what each version of this claim would look like. Then we 
will be in a better place to decide which will contribute to 
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building a compelling version of the relational argument 
schema. 
Let us begin with the simpler, descriptive 
interpretation of the claim that wrongdoing damages 
relationships. On this reading, (2) offers a description of 
typical psychological and social consequences of 
wrongdoing (call this the “actual-consequences” 
interpretation). The claim is that wrongdoing generally 
causes negative changes in how the victim, the wrongdoer, 
and sometimes also other members of the community 
relate to one another following the wrong: their beliefs 
about one another, the attitudes they experience (such as 
resentment, anger or hatred), the degree to which they trust 
or are willing to rely on one another, etc. These factors 
often combine to result in negative behaviors, such as 
outright wrongdoing (e.g., revenge) or reduced 
cooperation. Stronger or weaker versions of this 
descriptive version of premise (2) would draw stronger or 
weaker correlations between wrongdoing and such 
consequences. As we have seen, Sher doubts that these 
correlations are as robust as relational theorists usually 
seem to believe. In order to avoid that problem, I 
recommend a weak version of an “actual-consequences” 
premise:  
 
2ac. Wrongdoing sometimes actually causes 
negative changes to the involved parties’ beliefs, 
attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors 
regarding one another. 
 
The claim that wrongdoing “sometimes” leads to such 
consequences is so modest that it would be hard to deny. 
A second, normative interpretation of the claim, 
‘wrongdoing damages relationships,’ starts with the 
thought that, although the actual relations between the 
parties to a wrong might remain unaffected in a particular 
case, it would be reasonable if they did worsen. Let’s call 
this the “normative-consequences” version of (2). 
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Wrongdoing provides reason for the involved parties to 
negatively adjust their actual relations with one another. 
For example, victims of rights-violations would typically 
be justified in feeling resentment, limiting cooperation, 
and reducing their confidence that the wrongdoer will 
behave justly in the future. The strength of the reasons 
provided varies with the details of the particular cases, of 
course. I have greater reason to distrust a co-worker who 
intentionally destroyed my work in order to win a 
promotion for herself than a co-worker who absent-
mindedly broke a promise to cover my shift. Furthermore, 
these reasons are usually merely permissive reasons and 
not requirements. There may be nothing irrational, 
imprudent, or immoral in failing to resent or distrust my 
promise-breaking colleague (though, there may be in 
special circumstances). The idea is instead that it makes 
sense for vulnerable, social beings like us to change how 
we relate with wrongdoers in response to their misdeeds.  
According to the normative-consequences reading, 
then, to say that wrongdoing damages relationships is to 
say that wrongdoing provides normative reasons for actual 
relationships to worsen among beings like us. This claim 
is not empirical. The point is not to describe or predict how 
actual people react, psychologically and behaviorally, to 
experiences of wrongdoing; it is to make a normative 
claim about what is reasonable—about what a fair, 
prudent, or at least blameless reaction to a wrong would 
be. However, the normative-consequences claim is also 
informed by our experiences with wrongdoing. If our 
bodies were impervious to the blows of others, if our self-
respect were less vulnerable to other people’s attitudes 
toward us, if we did not need other people’s cooperation 
and company to lead fulfilling lives, then what would 
count as a reasonable reaction to wrongdoing would be 
different.  
So, in developing a normative account of justifiable 
reactions to wrongdoing, we reflect upon people’s actual 
tendencies to react. But, most important are the emotions, 
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attitudes, suspicions, and impulses people tend to 
experience when they occupy the participant stance with 
regard to the parties to a wrong. Sher may be correct that 
most victims of petty crime simply shrug off their losses. 
But this might simply be a sign that their relations with 
other people are already in a poor state. Their lack of 
resentment seems to indicate that they do not actually 
expect strangers to treat them with respect. In saying that 
resentment is a reasonable consequence of crime, the 
relational theorist (on this reading) is not making an 
empirical generalization about the actual correlation of 
crime and resentment, but a normative claim about what 
would be a fitting response among people like us were we 
to view one another as fellow participants in a community 
regulated by equal respect and moderate goodwill. In a 
healthy community (or at least one that grants property 
rights), thefts would be resented. 
The normative-consequences reading also deals well 
with other cases that are sometimes presented as 
counterexamples to relational theories in the literature. For 
example, Susan Wolf resists the claim that wrongdoing 
damages relationships by pointing to the everyday wrongs 
that are part of family life (2011). These wrongs—such as 
the unauthorized borrowing of clothes among siblings, 
neglected chores, and excessive nagging by parents—are 
typically trivial. Though they may lead to fleeting displays 
of heated emotions, in healthy families, no damage is 
really done to the underlying relationship. But the 
normative-consequences interpretation allows us to reply 
that these little injustices do indeed provide their victims 
with reasons to negatively adjust relationships, although 
these reasons are overpowered by stronger reasons to 
maintain robust goodwill and trust. There is still sense in 
referring to this as a very mild kind of relational damage 
or, better yet, as threatening (rather than as actually 
damaging) the relationship. Even strong interpersonal 
bonds can be weakened over time by the repetition of 
minor wrongdoing. One can repeatedly give one’s friend a 
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reason to break trust without actually losing his friendship, 
but it is like adding straw to the camel’s back; one risks a 
rupture.  
So, according to the normative-consequences 
interpretation, the claim that wrongdoing damages 
relationships is to be read as the claim that wrongdoing 
provides reason for the parties to a wrong to adjust their 
actual views of and interactions with one another for the 
worse. We should note, though, that while some negative 
changes are permitted in the aftermath of wrongdoing, 
there are limits. Central to the Kantian ethic is the principle 
that a person’s moral value is not conditional on his good 
behavior, but is instead intrinsic to his status as a moral 
agent. There are fundamental forms of respect, which 
Stephen Darwall calls recognition-respect, that must 
always be maintained (1977). If John cheats me, I am not 
allowed to cheat him in return, or have him beat up, or 
watch him drown when I am able to save his life. But I am 
permitted to lose what Darwall calls appraisal-respect for 
John. I need not think as well of him as I used to. Nor must 
I bear him as much goodwill as I did before. Since the duty 
of benevolence is merely imperfect, I can choose to bestow 
my benevolence on someone other than John. As Scanlon 
notes, I can also stop seeking out John’s company, taking 
pleasure in his success, or even hoping things go well for 
him (2008, 144-45). These sorts of negative changes to my 
actual relations with John can all be reasonable and 
involve no wrongdoing on my part.  
Let us formalize the normative-consequences 
interpretation as follows:  
 
2nc. Wrongdoing provides the involved parties with 
reasons to negatively adjust their beliefs, attitudes, 
emotions, expectations, or behaviors toward one 
another. 
 
The suggestion that wrongdoing always provides such a 
reason appears to be a rather strong claim, but I believe 
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that this is moderated by the fact that the reason in question 
is both merely permissive (one is not typically required to 
negatively adjust one’s relationship) and defeasible (it may 
be trumped or outweighed by other reasons). A more 
precise version of (2nc) would say that some of the parties 
have reason to adjust some aspects of their relationships 
with one another. For example, if Marie cheats on her 
spouse, it is far from clear that her coworkers have even a 
permissive reason to adjust the level of goodwill and 
patterns of cooperation that characterize their coworker 
relationships with her (cf. Radzik 2011). But since we are 
working toward an argument schema rather than a polished 
argument, let’s leave out these details.   
We have, then, two different interpretations of the 
claim that ‘wrongdoing damages relationships’ that seem 
promising: (2nc) and (2ac). Recall, the actual-
consequences version, focuses on the actual harms that 
sometimes follow wrongdoing: 
 
2ac. Wrongdoing sometimes actually causes 
negative changes to the involved parties’ beliefs, 
attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors 
regarding one another. 
 
In contrast, the normative-consequences version, (2nc), 
brings our attention to the idea that wrongdoing permits or 
justifies some negative adjustments to relationships, even 
if the parties have not, or have not yet, made these changes.  
We will need both of these interpretations in order 
to fill out our argument schema for relational justifications 
of blame, punishment, forgiveness, and atonement. Recall, 
the main idea of the argument schema is that blame, 
punishment, forgiveness, and atonement are valuable 
responses to wrongdoing because they repair relations. 
(2ac) and (2nc) point out two different ways in which 
relationships may stand in need of repair. They may have 
actually degraded, as compared to our moral ideal of 
interpersonal relations, or they may be threatened or 
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undermined by the fact that their degradation would be 
reasonable. If someone continues to trust and show 
goodwill to her friend only because she does not know that 
he is the person who wronged her, (2nc) allows us to 
describe that relationship as threatened, as undermined, 
and in need of repair. Another reason to keep both versions 
of the second premise focuses on the fact that actual 
responses to wrongdoing are not always reasonable. For 
example, victims may be filled with malice toward the 
wrongdoer and a desire for revenge. This kind of damage 
to the victim-wrongdoer relationship may not be 
reasonable, but it is in need of repair. One thing 
forgiveness does, on many accounts, is to moderate 
inappropriate or excessive reactions to wrongdoing (Butler 
1827, Sermon IX). 
 
 
5. We morally ought to repair our relationships 
 
Let us momentarily skip over premise (3) in our argument 
schema and turn next to premise (4): ‘we morally ought to 
repair our relationships.’ How should we interpret this 
claim? The key term in (4) is ‘repair.’ In thinking of what 
repair involves, let us refer back to the two interpretations 
of damage with which we ended the last section: the 
actual-consequences and the normative-consequences 
claims. From these follow two interpretations of repair: 
 
4ac. Any negative changes that wrongdoing actually 
causes to the involved parties’ beliefs, attitudes, 
emotions, expectations, or behaviors regarding one 
another ought to be reversed or ameliorated, other 
things being equal. 
 
4nc. Any reasons that wrongdoing provides to 
involved parties to negatively adjust their beliefs, 
attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors 
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toward one another ought to be counteracted or 
nullified, other things being equal. 
 
The notion of repair at work in (4ac) is one of rectifying 
some kind of damage that has already taken place in a 
relationship. A wrongdoer apologizing to angry victim 
would be an example of an attempt to repair a relationship 
that is already, actually damaged. In contrast, the notion of 
repair in (4nc) is more like disarming a threat than 
rebuilding something that is already broken. An 
illustration of this notion of repair might be apologizing to 
someone who claims not to care about having been 
mistreated.  
Both (4ac) and (4nc) are left intentionally vague 
because they are designed only for my argument schema 
rather than for a complete argument. For example, ‘ought’ 
might convey either a full-fledged obligation or the weaker 
idea that it would be a morally good thing if the 
relationship were repaired. If we were building an 
argument about atonement, the language of obligation 
would be appropriate. On the other hand, forgiveness is 
typically a matter of virtue rather than obligation; so in 
building a relational argument about forgiveness we would 
likely choose the weaker reading of ‘ought.’ Similarly, 
both (4ac) and (4nc) fail to clarify to whom the ‘ought’ is 
addressed. This again is necessary given the fact that my 
schema is meant to be adaptable to defenses of a number 
of responses to wrongdoing. Obligations to atone are 
addressed to wrongdoers; recommendations to forgive are 
typically addressed to victims. The ‘other things being 
equal’ caveat on both versions is meant to convey the idea 
that whether one ought to repair a relationship is sensitive 
to other factors, such as whether restoring trust or 
cooperation would be unreasonably imprudent or conflict 
with one’s other obligations. 
Still, even with all of this ambiguity, I think that both 
(4ac) and (4nc) suggest compelling moral ideas—ideas 
that provide an interpretation of respect for persons. We 
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should live with one another on terms of respect and 
goodwill. When the actual terms upon which we live with 
one another become degraded as a result of wrongdoing, 
we should endeavor to bring them into a more ideal state. 
Insofar as we give other people, or perceive other people 
as giving us, reason to worsen our relationships, we should 
try to counteract those reasons and create a context in 
which we have better reason to relate on good terms.  
I imagine that this latter claim, which is associated 
with (4nc), might cause some puzzlement. The claim that 
we ought to repair relationships that are actually damaged 
is understandable enough. But why must we race around 
trying to erase these free-floating “reasons”? Why does it 
matter if a reason to worsen relations is in some sense “out 
there” if no one actually accepts it as their own? My first 
response is, again, that too many straws break the camel’s 
back. This is just another way of saying that risks of future, 
bad consequences should be avoided. But this is not a very 
satisfactory answer. If those risks are low enough, why not 
take them? Why not continue breaking little promises to 
my husband? I am confident in his love and capacity for 
patience. I think I can get away with it for another fifty 
years. Of course, the proper response is that even if I could 
“get away with” such behavior, given his virtuous nature, 
I would not be living on proper terms with him. This state 
of affairs would be intrinsically bad. At this point, Sher 
might repeat his objection that the relational theory only 
works insofar as Kantian principles of right and wrong 
action are presupposed by it. Yet, as I claimed earlier, most 
relational discussions are not meant to be alternatives to an 
ethic of respect for persons; they are an articulation of it. 
If I am to properly respect with my husband, I should not 
give him reason to resent me. The mere fact that he 
(patient, loving fellow that he is) does not actually resent 
me is no assurance that I am living up to that standard.  
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6.  Relationships are repaired through blame, 
punishment, forgiveness, or atonement 
 
We are now in a better position to address the third premise 
in our argument schema: ‘Relationships are repaired 
through blame, punishment, forgiveness, or atonement.’ I 
should first mention that not everyone drawn to a relational 
framework must agree that all four of these responses to 
wrongdoing should be counted as reparative. Nor must 
they all be willing to follow the argument schema to its 
conclusion and claim that a reparative function makes that 
response morally justifiable, let alone obligatory. Some 
might follow the schema to defend the value of 
forgiveness, while doubting that blame is best seen as a 
form of reparation, or remaining skeptical about whether 
punishment can be justified at all.  
To say that a response such as forgiveness or 
atonement repairs relationships could mean one of two 
things, which correspond to the actual-consequences and 
normative-consequences lines of thought. The first claims 
that these responses have a kind of causal power. 
 
3ac. The negative changes to the parties’ beliefs, 
attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors 
toward one another that actually result from 
wrongdoing can sometimes be reversed or 
ameliorated by blame, punishment, forgiveness, or 
atonement. 
 
For example, Govier describes forgiveness as a process 
through which a victim rids himself of resentment and 
comes to a new view of the offender as someone who is 
capable of better action in the future (FR, 59). Acts of 
atonement from wrongdoers, such as apologies, 
sometimes enable victims to restore trust. Punishment of a 
criminal by the state might cause the victim to feel a more 
secure self-respect. In expressing blame, a witness to 
wrongdoing might successfully convince a wrongdoer to 
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change her ways. I have included the word “sometimes” in 
(3ac) to avoid Sher’s objection that relational theorists tend 
to exaggerate the causal efficacy of these sorts of 
responses to wrongdoing.  
The second, normative version of premise (3) focuses 
on how responses to wrongdoing affect the reasons we 
have for relating to one another in better or worse ways.  
 
3nc. The reasons wrongdoing provides for 
negatively adjusting beliefs, attitudes, emotions, 
expectations, or behaviors can be nullified or 
counter-balanced by blame, punishment, 
forgiveness, or atonement, when performed 
appropriately. 
 
Indeed, writings on relationships in the aftermath of 
wrongdoing are filled with claims that fit this basic pattern, 
such as: When a community blames a wrongdoer for a 
misdeed, the victim typically has less reason to feel 
vulnerable to future abuse. By making amends, the 
wrongdoer removes or weakens the reason she gave the 
victim to fear or distrust her. In regaining his ability to 
view the wrongdoer with compassion, a forgiving victim 
might counter-balance the reason he has to avoid the 
wrongdoer. In fairly punishing a criminal, the state may 
give community members a reason to put the past behind 
them and once again include the criminal in schemes of 
social cooperation.  
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
It is time now to rebuild our argument schema with the 
pieces we have fashioned in the preceding sections. The 
result is less ambiguous, though certainly more 
cumbersome. 
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1n. All people ought to take up the participant stance 
toward one another and cultivate relationships of 
respect and goodwill. 
 
2ac. Wrongdoing sometimes actually causes 
negative changes to the involved parties’ beliefs, 
attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors 
regarding one another. 
 
2nc. Wrongdoing provides the involved parties with 
reasons to negatively adjust their beliefs, attitudes, 
emotions, expectations, or behaviors toward one 
another. 
 
3ac. The negative changes to the parties’ beliefs, 
attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors 
toward one another that actually result from 
wrongdoing can sometimes be reversed or 
ameliorated by blame, punishment, forgiveness, or 
atonement. 
 
3nc. The reasons wrongdoing provides for 
negatively adjusting beliefs, attitudes, emotions, 
expectations, or behaviors can be nullified or 
counter-balanced by blame, punishment, 
forgiveness, or atonement, when performed 
appropriately. 
 
4ac. Any negative changes that wrongdoing actually 
causes to the involved parties’ beliefs, attitudes, 
emotions, expectations, or behaviors regarding one 
another ought to be reversed or ameliorated, other 
things being equal. 
 
4nc. Any reasons that wrongdoing provides to 
involved parties to negatively adjust their beliefs, 
attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors 
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toward one another ought to be counteracted or 
nullified, other things being equal. 
 
5. Therefore, such responses to wrongdoing are 
morally justified (or perhaps required), other things 
being equal. 
 
While this is still a long way from a complete and 
convincing defense of any of the four responses to 
wrongdoing, I hope that it helps put to rest Sher’s objection 
that the relational approach is irretrievably ambiguous and 
implausible.   
I hope to have also communicated what I find so 
compelling in the relational approach to the issues that 
arise in the aftermath of wrongdoing, which Govier has so 
greatly influenced. Wrongdoing is an obstacle to our living 
together on the terms of respect and goodwill that form our 
moral ideal. It is an obstacle both because of the myriad 
ways in which wrongs actually cause relationships to 
deteriorate and also because at least some of these forms 
of decay are perfectly legitimate. Resenting, distrusting, 
and fearing wrongdoers are reasonable responses to 
injustice. Govier asks us to think hard about cases from 
South Africa to Rwanda to Chile, where mere peaceful 
coexistence can seem like a miracle given the horrors of 
the past (Cases). The practical and moral challenges that 
the past poses to the present come to the fore much more 
effectively when we adopt a relational framework as 
opposed to a more traditional, and less social, Kantian one. 
For this approach, both descriptive and normative 
discussions of relationships are necessary. 
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